This article examines the international community's response to Indonesia's 1975 invasion of East Timor in light of recently declassified documents from the US, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. It argues that anti-Communist and geopolitical concerns at the end of the Vietnam War were not the only, and perhaps not even the most important explanations of Western support for Indonesia's takeover of East Timor. Rather, this article suggests that beliefs that East Timor was too small and too primitive to merit selfgovernance reinforced the perceived imperative of maintaining friendly relations with the Suharto regime, whose growing importance in the regional political economy overshadowed its defiance of international law.
On 20 May 2002, former President William J. Clinton stood in front of the newly opened US embassy in East Timor and congratulated the world's newest country on its independence after 24 years of Indonesian occupation and three years of United Nations Administration. 'I am very honored to be here because we were so involved in the struggle of the people of East Timor, and so supportive of this day' , Clinton offered without a trace of irony.
1 Former President Clinton's statement passed almost without comment in the Western press, which generally praised Australia, the United States and their allies for supporting East Timor's independence in 2002, while ignoring their role in enabling Indonesia's invasion and occupation of the former Portuguese territory 27 years earlier. Timor's recent history has been left largely to area studies experts, human rights activists, and a handful of Australian foreign policy scholars. 3 Histories of the end of the Vietnam War focus largely on its bloody aftermath in Cambodia, the trauma of Vietnamese refugees, or its domestic impact in the United States. 4 Accounts of Portugal's 1974 'Carnation Revolution' and the rapid decolonization of its imperial holdings likewise highlight Southern Africa and the Cold War crisis which emerged in Angola and Mozambique. 5 Even scholars of Henry Kissinger, US-Southeast Asian relations and US-Indonesian relations have accorded East Timor the briefest of treatment. Those that do focus almost wholly on the period immediately leading up to and following US President Gerald Ford's December 1975 visit to Jakarta overemphasize anti-Communist concerns in explaining US policy, ignore the views of Washington's Commonwealth allies, and argue, as Jussi Hanhimäki does in his otherwise perceptive and critical biography of Henry Kissinger, that the US role was limited to 'quiet assent' of Indonesian actions. 6 The recent partial declassification of US, United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australian documents warrants a reconsideration of the international community's response to Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor and its implications for international politics at the end of the Vietnam War. 7 While officials in Jakarta and other capitol cities seized upon concerns about the regional implications of the end of the Vietnam War, this article will argue that anti-Communism and geopolitics were not the only, and perhaps not even the most important explanations for Indonesian actions and the international community's acquiescence. The fall of Saigon in April 1975 and Communist victories in Laos and Cambodia did provoke anxious reassessments of the region's prospects on the part of both Asian leaders and Western diplomats, reassessments which reinforced the perceived role of Indonesia as a nonaligned but pro-Western bastion of anti-Communism in Southeast Asia. Such concerns partially explain the subordination of East Timor's fate to the perceived imperative of maintaining friendly relations with the Suharto regime, whose growing importance in the regional political economy overshadowed its defiance of international law. But East Timor's abortive anti-colonial experience also transcended Cold War concerns, reflecting the sub-imperial calculations of an Indonesia aspiring to a greater regional role and fearful of the fragility of its own post-colonial boundaries. Perhaps more important, the international community's response to Indonesia's actions reflected the belief that an independent East Timor would produce regional instability and was too small and too primitive to merit self-determination.
Embracing the New Order
Since the overthrow of the Sukarno regime and the Western-backed annihilation of Indonesia's Communist Party in late 1965 and early 1966, the authoritarian regime of General Suharto occupied a crucial and growing role in many nations' strategic thinking for the region. 8 The Nixon administration continued and intensified the commitment of its predecessor to forge 'especially close and cooperative relations' with Indonesia, viewing the strategically located country as a bastion of antiCommunism and stability, as well as a crucial source of resources and one of the fastest growing sites in the world for US private investment. 9 Between 1966 and 1974 Washington and its regional allies, led by Japan, played leading roles in underwriting the Suharto regime through such arrangements as the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), an aid consortium underwriting more than $450 million annually in economic assistance to Jakarta. The US alone averaged over $200 million per year in economic aid and more than $20 million in military assistance, emerging by 1974 as Indonesia's leading supplier of military aid, along with Australia, which providing military training. 10 The Indonesian government's dependence on foreign aid and investment and the military's bitter anti-communism, moreover, insured that while Indonesia resolutely maintained its non-alignment in public as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), its neutralism took a decidedly pro-Western hue. 11 As the United States gradually withdrew its armed forces from Vietnam in the early 1970 s, President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger expressed increasing interest in bolstering Indonesia's regional political and military role, a desire that President Suharto shared. 12 Although linked to Jakarta by no treaty, the Nixon White House effectively extended the Nixon Doctrine -which emphasized aiding regional antiCommunist surrogates to provide for their own security and regional stability -to Indonesia. Outside of Asia the chief beneficiary of the Nixon Doctrine was Iran, which during the 1970 s nearly sank into the sand under the weight of more than $15 billion in US weapons sales as it became one of the twin pillars of Nixon's Middle East strategy. US officials likewise suggested that Indonesia should play a larger role in Southeast Asian regional defence and that the US should begin increasing military assistance commensurate with that role. 13 Indonesian military officials agreed. President Suharto and his generals, led by Minister of Defence General Panggabean, argued that since 1966 Indonesia had prioritized the task of economic development to the detriment of its military position. Flush with oil revenue and anxious at the prospect of a gradual US withdrawal from the region, General Suharto was determined to modernize the Indonesian Armed Forces, preferably with US weapons and training. Indonesian officials repeatedly expressed their 'sense of urgency' in improving their military forces, and they adroitly exploited US fears about the impact of its withdrawal from Southeast Asia by suggesting that 'dwindling U.S. aid levels signals a decline in U.S. interest', hoping to leverage Kissinger's obsession with credibility into increased economic and especially military aid.
(FMS) credits as an alternative, they worried about opening 'a Pandora's box of military desires' that might distract Indonesia from the continued task of economic development. 16 The Carnation Revolution and East Timor's Awakening
The sudden collapse in April 1974 of Portugal's Caetano dictatorship and the prospects of decolonization in Portuguese Timor coincided with Indonesia's growing regional ambitions. For more than 400 years the eastern half of Timor, located 400 miles north of Australia in the southeastern end of the Indonesian archipelago, languished as a backwater of the Portuguese empire, while the western half became part of the Netherlands East Indies and later Indonesia. 17 Portuguese Timor first entered the consciousness of the West during World War II, when between 45,000 and 70,000 Timorese died (out of a total population of 450,000) during Japan's brutal occupation of the territory. 18 For the next 30 years Portuguese Timor witnessed comparatively little of the political turmoil which marked Portugal's African colonies. While anti-colonial resistance did increase, Portuguese authorities ran the colony with what José Ramos Horta, the de facto Foreign Minister of the Timorese resistance during the Indonesian occupation, characterized as benign neglect, utilizing it as a 'dumping ground for [Portuguese] political dissidents, failed professionals and incompetent bureaucrats'. 19 Until 1974 the Suharto regime publicly denied any interest in Portuguese Timor. Indonesian nationalist leaders widely accepted the principle of self-determination within former colonial boundaries, a principle they had invoked in appealing to the international community for their independence (and in demanding the 'return' of West New Guinea from the Dutch). At the same time, political elites in Jakarta periodically suggested that East Timor's future lay with Indonesia. Western officials had suspected Indonesian designs on the territory since the early 1960 s and considered the eastern half of Timor 'ripe for the plucking'. Following Indonesia's successful campaign in 1962 to gain control over West New Guinea from the Netherlands, foreign observers wondered if Indonesian President Sukarno might cast his gaze toward Portuguese Timor, 'an anachronism which Indonesians hint they will get around to in due course' , the Washington Post suggested. 20 As with neighbouring West New Guinea (later called West Irian or West Papua), both London and Washington considered Portuguese Timor too small, backwards and isolated to survive on its own and resigned themselves as a matter of policy to its eventual absorption by Indonesia in spite of their distaste for then President Sukarno -nearly 15 years before historians suggest either government began considering Timor's fate. 21 Within a few weeks of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) coup in Lisbon, Portuguese colonial officials began spelling out the range of options for the territory's political future: continued association with Portugal, independence, or integration with Indonesia. Within Timor's tiny educated elite, political groupings quickly formed around each of these options, with the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) initially supporting continued association with Portugal, the Association of Timorese Social Democrats (ASDT, later renamed Fretilin) committed to rapid independence from Portugal, and Apodeti (Timorese Popular Democratic Association) advocating integration with Indonesia. Apodeti remained a tiny party, but it received crucial support from Indonesian intelligence operatives. Though the UDT initially claimed the support of most Timorese, by mid-1975 Fretilin would emerge as the largest and best organized party in the territory due its programmes of popular education, labour organization, formation of cooperatives, and promotion of Timorese culture. 22 US officials in Washington and Jakarta thought nothing of Portuguese Timor in the months immediately following the MFA coup. Kissinger's attention was fixed firmly on Southern Africa, where the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola were in revolt and Soviet and Chinese interest raised Cold War concerns. Of more immediate concern were US-Portuguese negotiations over renewal of the US lease on the Lajes air base in the Azores islands off the coast of North Africa, which US military officials considered critical to NATO strategy and which the Air Force had used to airlift supplies to Israel during the October 1973 war. 23 Australian officials were more worried, a concern that stemmed from their longstanding views on East Timor as part of the country's northern strategic perimeter. Canberra was also anxious about the regional implications of the end of the Vietnam War, and, given the priority they placed on stable relations with Indonesia, officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) were sympathetic to Indonesia's asserted fears of possible Communist subversion in the archipelago, however improbable. 24 On 3 May 1974 the DFA drafted a policy paper arguing that 'Portuguese Timor is not at present a viable economic entity and . . . would have no capability in the short term to handle a self-governing or independent status'. Though 'there is no legal basis for an Indonesian claim to Portuguese Timor'. DFA official Peter Curtis wrote to Graham Evans of the Policy Planning Section a few days later, an independent Timor might become an object of Communist interest -though neither Moscow nor Beijing had expressed any. More important, an independent East Timor might serve as a rallying point for separatists elsewhere in the archipelago and was therefore 'obviously unacceptable' to Jakarta. The 'most logical long-term development' for Timor, Curtis concluded, 'is that it should become part of Indonesia', preferably through an act of self-determination -though how these contradictory goals could be reconciled was left unresolved. 25 
Operasi Komodo and Indonesian Intervention
Indonesia, in spite of British and US speculation during the Sukarno era, paid scant attention to Portuguese Timor until colonial authorities in Lisbon began publicly discussing decolonization. Initially Indonesian authorities publicly expressed support for Timor's possible independence, including Foreign Minister Adam Malik, who provided written assurances to this end to José Ramos Horta when he visited Jakarta in July 1974. Both Malik and President Suharto worried that a campaign to take Portuguese Timor would damage Indonesia's standing within the Non-Aligned Movement and, more important, threaten its access to military and economic aid from the US, Australia and other nations. A number of Suharto's closest military advisors, however, most notably Major-General Ali Murtopo, Major General Benny Murdani, Lieutenant-General Yoga Sugama, and Admiral Sudomo, quickly concluded that an independent Portuguese Timor posed a danger to Indonesian security and threatened to encourage separatist sentiment in the neglected eastern end of the archipelago. The rise in oil prices also made the territory's potentially vast undersea oilfields a tempting target. Perhaps most simply (and mistakenly), Suharto's generals thought taking Timor would be easy. Together, these officers headed the country's main intelligence agencies, Kopkamtib and Bakin, its Special Operations command (OSPUS) and a military-linked think-tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). According to a leading scholar of the period, Malik 'had no power base to match the influence of this formidable grouping on the Indonesian President' . 26 The case of the hawks on Timor was bolstered when President Suharto met Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam in Central Java on 6 September 1974. There Whitlam told Suharto plainly that 'Portuguese Timor should become part of Indonesia', though 'this should happen in accordance with the properly expressed wishes' of its inhabitants, at least 'for the domestic audience in Australia', which strongly supported meaningful self-determination. Suharto agreed, expressing his support for self-determination in Portuguese Timor but effectively ruling out independence as incompatible with Indonesian security and regional interests, an argument he repeated seven months later in a crucial meeting with Whitlam in Townsville. 27 Thus encouraged, Ali Murtopo initiated, with Suharto's approval, Operasi Komodo, a covert operation aimed at building support among Timorese parties for merger with Indonesia, initially through subversion and propaganda and later through terror and military attack. A crucial element of Komodo involved the dispatch of Indonesian officials to foreign capitals where they lobbied on behalf of Jakarta's position. On 30 December, in a Top Secret memo to Henry Kissinger, National Security Council staffer W.R. Smyser summarized a meeting with Indonesian defence attaché General Nichlany in which Nichlany 'expressed interest in knowing the American attitude toward Portuguese Timor (and, by implication, our reaction to a possible Indonesian takeover)'. 28 Over the next seven months, Operasi Komodo focused on sowing confusion and tension inside Portuguese Timor and attempting to split apart the UDT-Fretilin coalition which MFA movement representatives in Dili had helped form in January 1975. Bakin agents across the border in West Timor beamed propaganda and disinformation suggesting that Fretilin was a Communist organization, that the MFA was secretly working with Fretilin to hand over power to it, and that support for integration with Indonesia was building. These activities doubtless exacerbated already existing tensions between the two main parties in Portuguese Timor and made more difficult the task of Portuguese authorities who were attempting to develop a consensus around a plan for decolonization. While officials in Lisbon shared the doubts of US, Australian, British and other officials about the viability of an independent East Timor and the logic of absorption by Indonesia, reports from the territory revealed strong antipathy toward Indonesia and overwhelming support for independence. Portuguese authorities therefore continued working with the UDT, Fretilin and Apodeti to develop a decolonization programme, while meeting secretly with Indonesian military and Foreign Ministry officials in an attempt to ally their fears and convince them of the lack of support for integration. In May decolonization talks began under Portuguese auspices, leading to an agreement in late June in the territory of Macao outlining a phased three-year plan for decolonization, including the election of a constituent assembly in late 1976 and an end to Portuguese sovereignty by 1978.
As they monitored the situation in Timor, Indonesian military officials grew increasingly nervous, fearing that the Portuguese were speeding ahead with the decolonization process and realizing that their attempts to gain support for integration with Indonesia were failing. Komodo agents correspondingly accelerated what the US Embassy in Jakarta frankly termed 'propaganda operations' directed at Timor and the international community, accompanied by increasingly strong signals from Indonesian officials that Jakarta intended to incorporate the territory by force if necessary, even as they denied plans for a military takeover. 29 In mid-February Indonesia conducted a major joint military exercise in South Sumatra that US, Australian, New Zealand and British officials all viewed as a dry run for an amphibious invasion of East Timor. 30 Leaked accounts of the military exercises, however, provoked a widespread outcry in Australia and forced Jakarta to deny that Indonesia was planning to attack.
The uproar in Australia illustrated the crucial role that public opinion among the Suharto regime's supporters could play in restraining Indonesian actions. During this period Australian officials, alone among Indonesia's neighbours and major aid donors, appeared to engage in meaningful policy debate about the possibilities of resisting Indonesia's effort to incorporate Timor by force. No such debates took place in Washington or other capitals. Throughout the spring, while Prime Minister Whitlam sent supportive signals to Suharto, Australian diplomats attempted to convince Indonesian officials that an independent Timor need not pose a threat to its security. However, without a consistent message from Canberra these missives had little effect on military and political planning in Jakarta. 31 As Indonesia's intentions appeared more ominous, US officials in Jakarta prepared a series of contingency papers on Indonesia's likely intervention in Portuguese Timor. On 4 March W.R. Smyser outlined for Kissinger US policy options in light of Indonesia's ongoing covert operations. Smyser recommended, as had US Ambassador to Indonesia David Newsom, 'a general policy of silence' , arguing 'that we have considerable interests in Indonesia and none in Timor'. If the US opposed an invasion of East Timor, relations with Indonesia would suffer. If the US did nothing and Indonesia invaded, Congressional sanctions similar to those following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus might follow, damaging relations in either case. Given these options, Kissinger sided with Newsom and Smyser's recommendation of silence, offering only that, if asked, US officials should 'express the hope that any change in Portuguese Timor should be carried out peacefully'. 32 Such hopes were naïve at best. Indonesian military planners woefully underestimated the dangers and challenges that an invasion of East Timor would represent. 'There is no potential reservoir of sympathy for Indonesian over lordship among the Timorese elite or the population at large', the US consul in Surabaya argued following a December visit to the territory. Moreover, 'without local intelligence and a sympathetic population, conducting military operations in Timor would tax the capabilities of the best armed forces in the world', a category in which Indonesia could hardly be included. Any Indonesian attempt to forcibly integrate East Timor was likely to be a difficult, bloody, and expensive affair. 33 Given the pessimism of Western intelligence estimates, the unanimity of support among Indonesia's neighbours and supporters in favour of Timor's absorption by Jakarta is surprising. All agreed, as the leader of New Zealand's Opposition National Party Robert Muldoon told President Suharto in a meeting on 17 February, that 'a completely independent Portuguese Timor was not a viable economic proposition' -an 'indigestible lump' as another observer put it more colourfully. 34 All agreed with the South East Asian Department of Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office that 'Timor's eventual integration with Indonesia is probably the right answer in terms of regional stability ' . 35 Yet all agreed in principle that the people of Portuguese Timor had the right to self-determination and that if they exercised that right the vast majority would choose independence -a reality that Indonesian officials acknowledged. Concerns about Timor's backwardness and viability plainly outweighed concerns about Communism. 36 Officials from each nation, moreover, repeatedly said as much to their Indonesian counterparts, stressing again and again that integration with Indonesia should take place according to the wishes of the Timorese -though all acknowledged that Timorese wishes were for independence, not integration. 37 Crucially, though US, British and Australian intelligence services were in a position to refute the allegations of Indonesian propagandists concerning the situation in East Timor, Western embassies in Jakarta and their home governments chose not to. Instead, they monitored what officials variously described as the 'absurd', 'hysterical', and 'hamfisted' claims by Operasi Komodo operatives of 'leftist terror' in East Timor, most of which were reported by the semi-official Antara news agency or the Armed Forces newspaper Angkatan Bersenjata and 'obligingly carried by the foreign press' , amplifying their impact on the international community. 38 In Congressional testimony and later interviews, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Quinn and Ambassador David Newsom claimed that fears of Chinese control over Timor animated discussions in Washington and Jakarta. But fears of Communist meddling in the area played no role in shaping US policy. Rather the contention was, as Quinn argued, that 'East Timor was completely unprepared for self-governance'. Having concluded that no possible Timorese government -much less a left-leaning Fretilin one -was legitimate, due to the backwardness of its people, absorption by Indonesia emerged in the eyes of US officials as the only logical outcome of the decolonization process. 39 Overshadowing Indonesia's growing intervention in Portuguese Timor in the spring of 1975 was the final surrender of the US-backed South Vietnamese government and the end of the Vietnam War. In the months that followed, the Ford Administration sought to reassure its allies in the area that the United States was committed to regional engagement and to strengthening those nations that felt threatened by Hanoi's triumph. Henry Kissinger in particular believed that the US needed to 'restore, as far as was possible, the image of the United States as a tough power and a reliable ally', not for fear of Vietnamese expansionism but out of concern for the credibility of American power. 40 In The consensus in the Ford Administration was that the US needed to strengthen and reassure friends in the region, primarily through military assistance, of Washington's commitment to regional security. In a meeting with President Ford on April 25 Kissinger recommended the establishment of joint commissions with Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and President Suharto and urged an easing of MAP conditions to permit the provision of surplus military equipment from Cambodia and Vietnam. 42 Strategic calculations also entered the picture, namely the US desire for nuclear submarines to pass through Indonesian territorial waters and the deep sea narrows off the coast of Timor on their way from the Indian to the Pacific oceans, where they would remain hidden from prying Soviet eyes. 43 For the Suharto regime, the months following South Vietnam's collapse signalled an opportunity to leverage US concerns about the impact of Hanoi's victory for increased military assistance and support for its intention to incorporate Portuguese Timor.
In early July President Ford held his first consultative meetings with President Suharto at Camp David, while Secretary of State Kissinger met with Foreign Minister Adam Malik in Washington. Suharto's delegation arrived in Washington seeking assurances 'that the U.S. intends to continue an active role in Southeast Asia', guarantees of continued economic support, and a commitment to 'building up [Indonesia's] neglected armed forces'. 44 President Suharto astutely cast Indonesia's desire for continued US economic and military assistance in terms of the need to build up the 'national resilience' of countries in the region to resist Communist subversion.
In spite of Congressional restraints on foreign aid, the Ford Administration offered to provide Indonesia with surplus naval vessels, tanks and aircraft. The Administration also pledged an increase in US military assistance to nearly $43 million for Fiscal Year (FY) 1976. Suharto ended his meeting with Ford by raising the issue of Timor (a topic not included in the President's briefing papers for the visit). After assuring his host that Indonesia supported decolonization through self-determination, Suharto argued that the Portuguese colony 'would hardly be viable', that the majority of Timor's inhabitants 'want[ed] unity with Indonesia', and that 'the only way' to decolonize 'is to integrate into Indonesia'. 45 US intelligence was by now regularly monitoring Indonesian propaganda activity and military mobilization in the region and was well aware of Jakarta's intention to absorb Portuguese Timor by force if necessary. But Ford said nothing. The President's response was doubtless encouraging to the hawks in Jakarta seeking to convince Suharto to agree to an open invasion of the territory.
Suharto's visit to the US culminated an intensive period of Indonesian diplomacy and covert operations associated with Operasi Komodo. Ali Murtopo and other hawks had yet to convince Suharto of the need for or wisdom of direct military intervention, Harry Tjan Silalahi of CSIS told the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. But the final decision had been made and all events now 'had to be seen in the context of Indonesia's overriding objective of incorporating Portuguese Timor', with possible options ranging from a voluntary Timorese decision to integrate to 'armed intervention in Portuguese Timor by Indonesia -the use of force without provocation'. Indonesian officials judged that the country could withstand the international reaction to even a full-scale military invasion, since only Australia and China were expected to protest and Jakarta judged that it could count on US and British support in the UN. 46 By this point Indonesia's neighbours and supporters had all come to similar policy conclusions regarding policy toward an invasion of East Timor. As the British Embassy in Jakarta cabled Whitehall, 'it is in Britain's interests that Indonesia should absorb the territory as quickly and unobtrusively as possible, and that if it comes to the crunch and there is a row in the UN we should keep our heads down and avoid siding with the Indonesians'. Other governments basically agreed. 47 'There is no doubt . . . that our relations with Indonesia are more important to us in the long term than the future of Portuguese Timor', Australian Ambassador Richard Woolcott wrote to the Foreign Ministry in Canberra after a meeting with General Yoga Sugama, one of the architects of Operasi Komodo. 'I know that I am suggesting that our principles should be tempered by the proximity of Indonesia and its importance to us and by the relative unimportance of Portuguese Timor but, in my view, this is where our national interest lies.' The interest foreign governments took in Portuguese Timor correspondingly diminished as they concluded that Indonesia intended to go forward with its plans and that no one, the most important no one being the Ford Administration, intended to offer meaningful opposition. Australian Embassy officials observed at the end of July that Timor 'is becoming almost a taboo subject for key Embassies here -Singapore and the other ASEAN countries, the United States and the Netherlands' . 48 The British Foreign Ministry instructed its Ambassador in Jakarta to 'not attempt to seek any information on Indonesian attitudes towards Timor' from Indonesian or even Australian officials. US Ambassador David Newsom told his Australian counterparts in Jakarta that he was likewise 'under instructions from Kissinger personally not to involve himself in discussions on Timor with the Indonesians'. 49 
East Timor's Civil War and the Fretilin Interregnum
The Indonesian military's growing impatience seems to have stemmed in part from the continued leftward shift in Portuguese politics and Fretilin's growing support within Portuguese Timor. 50 Recognizing that their efforts to build support for Apodeti and integration had failed, Operasi Komodo agents now accelerated their efforts to provoke a conflict in Timor between the UDT and rival Fretilin that would justify Indonesian intervention. At the end of the month UDT leaders travelled to Jakarta, where Ali Murtopo warned that Fretilin was under Communist control and that Indonesia would never allow an independent Timor under Fretilin leadership. The UDT leadership apparently concluded that Portuguese Timor's hopes for independence now depended upon curbing Fretilin influence and convincing the party to purge its restive left wing. 51 On 11 August the UDT launched a coup attempt in Dili and outlying areas, plunging the country into a brief but bloody civil war in which perhaps 2,000 people were killed and atrocities were committed by both sides. 52 Unable to halt the violence, Portuguese officials and soldiers retreated to the nearby island of Atauro. Indonesian officials immediately blamed the ensuing violence on Fretilin, which had boycotted decolonization talks in June because of Apodeti's participation, and suggested that they might be forced to intervene in light of Portugal's inability to restore order. To Indonesia's surprise, however, Fretilin quickly recovered and routed UDT forces, establishing effective control over the entire territory and driving armed UDT and Apodeti supporters across the border into neighbouring West Timor.
The White House reaction to East Timor's civil war was predictable. At Kissinger's daily staff meeting on 12 August, Philip Habib characterized the UDT coup as a reaction to the 'Communist-dominated' Fretilin, echoing the efforts of Indonesian propagandists to cast Jakarta's concerns in Cold War terms. In such circumstances, Habib argued, the US 'should just do nothing'. The Secretary of State agreed, observing 'it is quite clear that the Indonesians are going to take over the island sooner or later'. 53 By this point Western intelligence agencies were well aware of Indonesia's provocation of the UDT coup, its control over Apodeti, and the building pressure on Suharto to approve an invasion of East Timor. US Ambassador to Indonesia David Newsom's only concern, as expressed to Australian officials, was that if Jakarta decided to invade it should do so 'effectively, quickly and not use our equipment'. 54 Officials in Washington, Canberra and London, however, were also aware of Suharto's caution -twice vetoing an invasion during August alone. Such caution reflected his concern over the likely US and international reaction to an Indonesian invasion. 55 Suharto's worries were threefold: first, that precipitate action over East Timor would jeopardize international economic assistance, a crucial concern in the wake of the revelations about the insolvency of the state-owned oil company Pertamina; second, that since Indonesia was 'so dependent on U.S. arms', as a British Embassy official put it, an invasion might lead to a cutoff of current military aid; and, third, that an invasion would jeopardize the long-term US military assistance that the armed forces were counting on to undertake their plans for military modernization. 56 'The President [Suharto] does not want to take any action which might prejudice his hopes of arms supplies from the Americans and Australians', the British Embassy reported.
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In a crucial meeting with General Yoga Sugama on 21 August, US Ambassador David Newsom spelled out his country's policy concerning the use of its weapons and the 1958 US-Indonesian mutual defence treaty which prohibited their use for offensive purposes. Newsom warned that an outright invasion might jeopardize US assistance by prompting an aid cutoff on Capitol Hill. Newsom went on to clarify, however, that 'the executive was more sympathetic to Indonesia's position than the Congress, and that he hoped Yoga understood', concluding that the US viewed Timor entirely in terms of its relationship with Indonesia. The clear implication of this exchange was that Congress, not the White House, would be the problem in the event Indonesia went into Timor and that the White House would seek to minimize the domestic impact of an invasion in the interests of preserving its relationship with Jakarta. 58 Three weeks after the UDT coup attempt the Defense Intelligence Agency and other observers reported that 'serious fighting . . . has evidently ended' and that Fretilin had gained effective control over Portuguese Timor. 59 Party leaders immediately abandoned calls for rapid independence and pledged their support for the gradual decolonization programme agreed to in June in the hopes of defusing the prospects of an invasion. Fretilin leaders also issued calls for humanitarian assistance and pleaded for international observers to visit the territory and confirm that it was in control and seeking to establish a functioning administrative apparatus. Portuguese colonial officials, meanwhile, sought to restart talks between the UDT, Fretilin and Apodeti and called for the introduction of an international peacekeeping force in Timor (a call Indonesia rejected) in the hopes of rescuing a decolonization process that Indonesian covert operations were increasingly rendering irrelevant. Fretilin's ascendancy convinced Indonesian military officials of the need to escalate its propaganda operations and begin preparing for a full-scale invasion. On 4 September the State Department reported that Indonesia had begun sending special forces soldiers across the border into East Timor to fight against Fretilin troops and to attempt to organize the remnants of UDT and Apodeti forces. 60 Over the next two weeks a steady stream of daily British, American and Australian intelligence reports monitored a mounting covert military assault on East Timor by what the British Embassy characterized as 'irregular units of the Indonesian armed forces in the guise of UDT and Apodeti supporters'. 61 The purpose of these covert operations was acknowledged by the CIA: 'to engage Fretilin forces, encourage proIndonesia elements, and provoke incidents that would provide the Indonesians an excuse to invade should they decide to do so'. Publicly, Indonesia denied any intention
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International reporting on East Timor took on a surreal cast in the months leading up to the 7 December attack on Dili. Virtually every observer who travelled to the territory during this period agreed with the Australian Embassy that 'Fretilin is in effective control' , that it was garnering increasing public support from a population which opposed integration with Indonesia and that 'a peaceful handover of power to Fretilin is possible'. 63 Indonesian propaganda, however, sought to undermine Fretilin's claims to control East Timor by suggesting that UDT and Apodeti forces had regrouped, rearmed, taken the initiative, and were progressively driving Fretilin back toward the Timorese capital. On 2 October, for example, the Indonesian news agency Antara reported that 'anti-Fretilin' and 'anti-Communist Movement (ACM)' forces had launched attacks against Fretilin in four separate areas along the border with West Timor. These reports continued to proliferate over the course of October and November as Indonesian military operations escalated. According to journalists who visited the territory and observers in Dili, however, the alleged attacks simply never took place, because there were no UDT or Apodeti forces to undertake them, but rather Indonesian special forces, RPKAD (Army Para Commando Regiment), Brimob (Police Mobile Brigade Forces) and infantry units engaging in direct combat with Fretilin forces. The effect was to manufacture out of whole cloth an imaginary conflict between contending Timorese parties, creating a propaganda line that officials in Washington, London, Canberra and Wellington refused to contradict. 64 As Indonesia escalated its attack on East Timor, the Ford Administration moved ahead with plans begun by its predecessor to deepen relations with the Suharto regime. In mid-August, the NSC proposed that President Ford travel to Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries to offer reassurance of Washington's continued commitment to the region. 65 On 15 September an Indonesian military team arrived in Washington to discuss the possible provision of four C-123 and three C-130 aircraft to Indonesia from Vietnam surplus stocks. East Timor was not raised at all. 66 Six weeks later, just a month before his scheduled visit to Jakarta and after a month of USmonitored Indonesian attacks against East Timorese towns and cities, President Ford signed National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 311 establishing a joint US-Indonesian Consultative Commission. 67 The Indonesian Attack on East Timor On 7 October Indonesian forces launched their first full-scale attack on East Timor at the border town of Batugade. 68 Over the next ten days Indonesian troops attacked numerous border towns, culminating in a multi-pronged assault near the town of Balibo in which five Australian newsmen were murdered. 69 Indonesian officials told their Australian counterparts that they hoped to drive Fretilin forces back to Dili and encircle the capital by 15 November. 70 Publicly, however, Foreign Minister Adam Malik and others simply denied that any attack had taken place, though his account was flatly contradicted by virtually every foreign observer and by Fretilin officials who made repeated appeals to the United Nations for help. With UN Security Council members unwilling to even publicly acknowledge the attack, however, there was little that Timorese officials could do. 71 Western officials immediately acknowledged the military escalation in private, but chose to remain silent rather than criticize Jakarta. 72 'It looks like the Indonesians have begun the attack on Timor', Philip Habib announced at the Secretary of State's staff meeting on 8 October. 'There are no moral lessons to be learned from this?' asked Kissinger. 'Yes. The moral lesson is that we have the guns to go in', Habib replied to laughter in the room. The Secretary was worried. 'I'm assuming you're really going to keep your mouth shut on this subject?' he pressed his staff. Ambassador David Newsom later told British Embassy officials in Jakarta that 'Timor was high on Kissinger's list of places where the U.S. does not want to comment or get involved'. 73 The Secretary clearly was worried that, like Turkey's invasion of Cyprus the year before, international condemnation of Indonesian attacks on Timor would provoke Congress to pass sanctions and torpedo the Administration's efforts to forge closer ties to Jakarta. 74 Two weeks later, an Indonesian delegation led by General Ali Murtopo and Liem Bian Kie of the Centre for International Studies, two of the leading architects of Operasi Komodo, travelled to Washington to meet with senior State Department, CIA, Defense Department officials and more than 50 Senators and Representatives to argue for closer US-Indonesian ties. As Murtopo met with CIA Director William Colby, the CIA and DIA confirmed that Indonesian pilots flying US-supplied C-47 gun ships and B-26 bombers had begun striking targets inside East Timor, a topic no US official raised. 75 To the contrary, in his meeting with Ali Murtopo NSC Staffer General Brent Scowcroft was instructed to offer praise for 'Indonesia's restraint' in its handling of the Timor issue. New Zealand officials, among others, offered similar praise even as their embassies documented the continued Indonesian military offensive. 76 Unable to deny the scale of Indonesian attacks on Timor and embarrassed by detailed media coverage of the deaths of five Australian Newsmen at Balibo, the Whitlam Government in Canberra offered mild public criticism of Indonesian actions, while privately assuring Indonesian officials of its understanding of the Suharto regime's dilemma. 77 Through the month of November, Fretilin officials pressed the international community to prevent Indonesia's impending invasion. Portuguese officials carried on pushing for continued talks with Jakarta and representatives of the three major Timorese parties, but Indonesian officials realized that Lisbon had no power to force a settlement leading to integration and was unwilling to 'invite' the Indonesian armed forces to intervene. Talks in Rome between Portuguese and Indonesian officials produced little substantive agreement other than a joint statement reaffirming Lisbon's responsibility for decolonization in Portuguese Timor in the context of selfdetermination. 78 Foreign Minister Adam Malik was more anxious to prevent UN involvement. He worried that the upcoming United Nations Decolonization Committee hearings on Timor, where Fretilin had allies among newly independent African nations and former Portuguese colonies, would result in a resolution supporting both self-determination and independence. The Indonesian government also opposed a visit to the territory by representatives of the Committee, since according to the British Embassy, 'such a mission could only report that Fretilin was in effective control of Portuguese Timor, and so advance its cause internationally'. 79 On 28 November Fretilin unilaterally declared independence for East Timor. Few governments took much notice. The declaration came after more than a week of a stepped-up Indonesian military offensive, including extensive shelling from Indonesian naval vessels just off the north coast from the capital of Dili. Five days earlier Fretilin officials had petitioned the UN Security Council to intervene and stop Indonesian attacks, while José Ramos Horta met with foreign embassies in Canberra. The US Ambassador to Australia listened to Horta's pleas and warnings of an imminent invasion 'without comment'. The CIA's analysis, reflecting the nearunanimous opinion of foreign observers, was that the declaration 'appears to be a desperate Fretilin effort to protect itself from Indonesian military operations'. 80 In West Timor, Operasi Komodo operatives quickly drafted a petition by the UDT and Apodeti denouncing Fretilin's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and declaring for integration with Indonesia. The UDI was the sort of justification for a full scale invasion that Indonesian officials had been waiting for, and they immediately signalled that an attack was imminent. 81 The Suharto regime's desire to modernize the Indonesian armed forces using US weaponry and its perceived need to maintain close ties to Washington conferred upon the Ford Administration enormous leverage which it simply failed to exert, though it was clear at the time that meaningful US opposition might have prevented an invasion. Indonesia's invasion took place against the backdrop of President Ford and Henry Kissinger's planned visit to Southeast Asia and China, which included a stopover in Jakarta on 5-6 December to discuss the recent joint US-Indonesia consultative arrangement. The prospect of a full-scale attack before Ford's visit clearly worried the State Department, which suggested sending 'an urgent message . . . requesting the Indonesians to make no announcement and to take no military action until well after the President's departure from Jakarta', a request Suharto's generals granted. 82 General Suharto -who had up to this point refrained from invading East Timor precisely for fear of a possible military aid cutoff -had rightly concluded that the Ford Administration supported Indonesian actions and would work to prevent Congress from punishing it. 83 While US officials had informed Indonesian officials of the implications of attacking Timor with US equipment, no one ever suggested that the Ford Administration might itself sanction Indonesia if it decided to take East Timor by force. As if to underscore Washington's leverage, just two weeks before President Ford's December 1975 visit to Jakarta, a draft briefing paper for the President on East Timor acknowledged that a 'major factor in restraining Jakarta to this date' had been concern expressed over invasion 'inevitably using U.S.-supplied weapons'. 84 President Ford's briefing papers for his Jakarta trip framed the visit squarely in the context of the White House's post-Vietnam emphasis on encouraging Indonesia's growing regional leadership role, broadening the US relationship with Jakarta, and reassuring Suharto of Washington's commitment to Southeast Asian security. East Timor ranked low on Kissinger's priorities (it was last on the list of Ford's talking points). The Secretary of State recommended that if Suharto raised the issue the President should express sympathy for 'the problem that Timor poses for Indonesia' and praise for Indonesian 'restraint', which, as the CIA and DIA had recently reported, included the shelling of Timorese cities and Fretilin positions by warships blockading the island, cross-border attacks by nearly 3,000 Indonesian troops, and bombing runs by US-supplied aircraft. 85 While Ford and Kissinger were in Beijing on 4 December, the State Department and CIA both reported that President Suharto had apparently authorized a full-scale invasion of East Timor to begin shortly after Air Force One departed from Jakarta. 86 President Suharto's visit with President Ford and Henry Kissinger predictably focused on the aftermath of the end of the Vietnam War and the possible threat posed by China and North Vietnam. Both Presidents agreed that Vietnam's ambitions were more of a worry than China's (which Ford suggested was pursuing a 'restrained foreign policy'), and that the uncertainty produced by the rapid fall of Saigon warranted accelerated regional efforts to achieve greater military and economic cooperation. Toward the end of the meeting Suharto turned the subject to Timor. He declared that Indonesia had no territorial ambitions and was only concerned with 'the security, tranquility and peace of Asia', which Fretilin had disturbed through its actions and independence declaration. In light of these circumstances, the Indonesian President asked for US 'understanding' if Indonesia decided to take 'drastic action.' Ford's reply left no room for misunderstanding. 'We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intentions you have. ' Kissinger suggested that 'we would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return... If you have made plans, we will do our best to keep everyone quiet until the President returns home' . The Secretary of State worried about the prospects of a lengthy guerrilla war in Timor and emphasized to Suharto that 'It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly'.
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Henry Kissinger has understandably been reluctant to acknowledge his role in supporting the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. When questioned about his and President Ford's meeting with Suharto, the former Secretary of State has either denied discussing Timor or insisted that the subject was mentioned only in passing. White House Press spokesman Ronald Nesson made similar claims the day after Indonesia invaded. Other former US officials in Jakarta have suggested that the White House only found out about Indonesia's intentions on the eve of the invasion, and that Indonesia's concerns 'appeared reasonable in light of the reports the United States had received on developments there' . Both claims are false and ignore voluminous evidence which demonstrates that Washington knew of Indonesia's intentions to take Timor by force for nearly a year and had followed Indonesia's covert military attack on the territory on a daily basis for more than three months without taking any action. The US decision to support Indonesia's invasion of East Timor was conscious and deliberate. 88 
The Invasion of East Timor and the International Reaction
A few hours after Ford and Kissinger left Jakarta, early on the morning of 7 December Indonesian paratroopers began parachuting into the coastal capital of Dili. Indonesian warships in the harbour pounded the surrounding hills with artillery, while marines assaulted the beaches. Nearly 10,000 troops participated in the chaotic initial invasion of East Timor, prompting Fretilin soldiers to withdraw to the surrounding hills where they had been storing food and supplies in preparation for a guerrilla campaign. Timorese witnesses described a chaotic and brutal assault marked in the first days by the indiscriminate killing by Indonesian soldiers of hundreds of civilians, ethnic Chinese, even UDT and Apodeti members who had ostensibly called for integration. 89 The British Embassy reported two weeks later that 'once the Indonesian forces had established themselves in Dili they went on a rampage of looting and killing', but recommended to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that it deny having any information on alleged Indonesian atrocities and later warned 'key Indonesians' of the need to 'prepare for public reports of atrocities by volunteers' . 90 Within hours of Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll sent Kissinger a briefing memorandum arguing that 'the U.S. has no interests in Portuguese Timor per se', and that any interest related 'solely to its broader interests' with Indonesia, Australia, Portugal and other countries in the region. 'It would appear best . . . for the U.S. to follow Indonesia's lead on the issue', Ingersoll concluded, taking an 'essentially passive stance' . 91 Indonesia's neighbours agreed. 'There was in fact a shared objective (integration through internationally acceptable means) . . . however repugnant Indonesia's present methods of achieving that objective' , Australian Ambassador to Indonesia Richard Woolcott cabled the Foreign Ministry in Canberra. New Zealand's Secretary of Foreign Affairs Frank Corner likewise urged a pro-Indonesian stance upon Prime Minister Robert Muldoon, arguing that the nation's 'strong interest in maintaining good relations with Indonesia might on occasion require some measure of compromise on matters of principle'. 92 Weighing the likely international reaction to the invasion, the CIA rightly concluded that 'most members of the world community . . . want to bury this issue as soon as possible'. East Timor's isolation, moreover, would 'facilitate the efforts the Indonesians are sure to make to keep information on Timorese dissidents from reaching the outside world'. 93 The White House was hardly inclined to complain. A week after the invasion the National Security Council ordered the urgent dispatch of a package of golf balls to President Suharto as a 'personal gift from President Ford'. It was the first communication between the White House and Jakarta since Ford's departure. There was no mention of Timor. 94 The American press apparently got the message, and coverage of East Timor quickly evaporated. 95 In contrast, Australia's tacit support for Indonesia's invasion of East Timor presented its government with major problems due to 'the keen interest of . . . public opinion' in the plight of the Timorese. 96 Canberra's position was deeply unpopular domestically and immediately sparked a vocal and well-organized Timor solidarity movement which included significant Parliamentary and labour support. Here geography and history trumped the anti-Communism and realpolitik of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs. 'Simple proximity, together with a historical memory of the sacrifice paid by East Timorese protecting Australian soldiers against Japanese attacks in World War II, played their role' in sparking this movement, 'as did the presence in Australia of a growing East Timorese refugee community.' 97 Several European nations also witnessed the rise of East Timor solidarity groups: Portugal, due to its colonial ties and refugee population; the Netherlands, due to its historic ties to Indonesia; and Britain, which served as headquarters for human rights groups such as Amnesty International, the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), and TAPOL, an Indonesian human rights campaign started by a former Indonesian political prisoner. 98 In the United States, however, East Timor remained the concern of a tiny coterie of scholars, journalists, Catholic Church activists, Portuguese Americans, and human rights activists in and out of Congress. The lack of historic ties and the evaporation of media coverage in the wake of the invasion, especially compared to Australia, rendered public opinion a non-factor. 99 The relative silence in the US on East Timor contrasts starkly with what one historian has aptly called the 'phenomenal burst of human rights activism in the United States' in the mid-1970 s. In fact, Congress never even raised the issue of Timor until after Indonesia's invasion, with the prior interest of Congressional human rights advocates confined to the plight of Indonesian political prisoners. 100 Attention quickly focused on the United Nations, where Guinea-Bissau introduced a resolution into the General Assembly 'strongly deplor[ing]' Indonesian aggression and calling on Indonesia to withdraw its forces from East Timor without delay. General Assembly resolution 3485 passed overwhelmingly on 12 December (72 votes to 10, with 43 abstentions), with Australia surprisingly voting in favour, the United States and most of Europe abstaining and Japan voting against. Ten days later the UN Security Council unanimously approved a watered-down resolution 'call[ing] upon' Indonesia to withdraw its forces from the territory and requesting a UN fact-finding mission to visit and assess the situation. On 22 April 1976 the Security Council again passed a similar resolution, this time with the US and Japan abstaining. 101 Supporters of the Suharto regime were determined from the start to prevent the United Nations from effectively responding to Indonesia's invasion. British and New Zealand officials considered the 12 December General Assembly resolution 'shocking' and dangerously close 'to condemning Indonesia's action and calling for an immediate withdrawal'. 102 The US Embassy in Jakarta, supported by Japan, strongly urged Moynihan to abstain on or vote against 'any resolution which [is] unacceptable to Indonesia'. 103 Even ostensible opponents such as the Soviet Union and China failed to act, undermining arguments that the invasion stemmed the possible spread of Communism in the region. Indonesian officials understood that they would face criticism at the United Nations, but correctly judged the balance of political forces to be in their favour. According to the CIA, Jakarta considered the Security Council's actions 'little more than a slap on the wrist'. 104 Fretilin representatives during this period pursued a two track strategy of military struggle inside the territory and diplomacy at the UN, hoping to win recognition as the 'sole representative' of the Timorese people, but its efforts produced little support outside of 'newly-independent lusophone African countries' and a handful of Non-Aligned Movement members. 105 Confident that international interest in Timor would fade, the Suharto regime blocked the international community at every turn. Indonesian officials insisted that the international community deal with the puppet Provisional Government of East Timor (PGET) set up by military commanders in West Timor and Dili, and continued to insist that there were no Indonesian soldiers in East Timor, only Indonesian 'volunteers'. In response to the Security Council's 22 December resolution, the Indonesian Ambassador declared that Jakarta would cooperate with the United Nations 'only on its own terms' and characterized as 'irrelevant' demands for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the territory. 106 'Indonesia will not in practice accept any form of international intervention', the British Embassy in Jakarta observed, except 'to give respectability to an act of integration dressed up as selfdetermination'. 107 
'Illegally and Beautifully': Washington's Blessing
In addition to raising the prospect of intervention at the United Nations, Indonesia's invasion of East Timor risked a cutoff of US military assistance. For months, State Department officials had warned of a possible Congressional backlash from an Indonesian attack using US equipment, similar to that involving Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus. This concern unquestionably animated Secretary of State Kissinger's efforts to bury discussion of Timor and move ahead with increased military aid. 108 Indonesia's use of US-supplied military equipment, however, was difficult to deny and harder to hide. 109 As the attack on Dili commenced, the CIA's National Intelligence Daily reported that 'Indonesian troops used U.S. equipment in their attack on Portuguese Timor'. 110 A week later the National Security Council prepared a detailed analysis of the Indonesian military units involved in the invasion and the US equipment they used. US-supplied destroyer escorts shelled East Timor as the attack unfolded; Indonesian marines disembarked from US-supplied landing craft; USsupplied C-47 and C-130 aircraft dropped Indonesian paratroops and strafed Dili with .50 calibre machine guns; while the 17th and 18th Airborne brigades which led the assault on the Timorese capital were 'totally U.S. MAP supported', and their jump masters US trained. US and Indonesian officials later conceded that 'Indonesian armed forced are equipped 90% with US equipment'. 111 The US Secretary of State, however, was determined to squelch discussion of East Timor and the use of US weapons, and ordered the US Embassy in Jakarta again to 'cut down on their reporting to Washington'. 112 On 18 December Kissinger exploded at his State Department staff for requesting a legal opinion on the legitimacy of Indonesia's use of US weapons in the invasion in response to an inquiry by Senator Gary Hart. 'The Indonesians were violating an agreement with us' , State Department Legal Advisor Monroe Leigh bluntly replied. Kissinger was unmoved. 'On the Timor thing', he said, 'that will leak in three months and it will come out that Kissinger overruled his pristine bureaucrats and violated the law . . . You have a responsibility to recognize that we are living in a revolutionary situation. Everything on paper will be used against me.'
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The State Department's response to this potential crisis was to move ahead with plans for increased assistance while suggesting otherwise to Congress. Kissinger ordered his staff to tell Congress that Washington had temporarily suspended further assistance until it reached a determination on the use of US weapons, something the NSC had already done. In fact the United States never suspended military assistance to Jakarta, though former Ambassador Paul Gardner claims otherwise. 114 When Australian Ambassador to Indonesia Richard Woolcott complained about the problems the alleged cutoff would pose for Canberra's own assistance to Indonesia, Ambassador David Newsom told him that 'there is no suspension, and that Kissinger [is] determined to avoid any'. 115 The alleged US aid cutoff was so secret that Indonesia was never informed -Embassy officials were barred from even discussing the matterbut to be on the safe side the US Ambassador requested contingency plans for evading possible Congressional sanctions in the event that aid ever was cut off. Three months later, a survey of Indonesia's military aid requirements by the US Embassy's Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) proceeded on the basis of a near doubling of military aid to $38.1 million in FY 1976 and a further 25% increase to $47.4 million in FY 1977. 116 The Ford Administration's deception of Congress took on added importance in light of the fierce fighting which continued in East Timor through the spring of 1976 and reports that Indonesian forces were committing substantial atrocities. In midApril Senators Hubert Humphrey and Clifford Case initiated a Congressional inquiry into the use of US weapons by Indonesia in the invasion of East Timor. 117 The State Department's response simply reiterated Indonesian claims that the PGET was in full control of the territory and that fighting had largely ended. 118 Indonesia's firm control over international access to East Timor enabled it to control news coming from the territory, much of which was obligingly broadcast as fact by the international media and Western officials whose intelligence contradicted Indonesia's claims. 119 But as Western intelligence agencies were well aware, the Indonesian invasion had bogged down and was creating serious hardships for the Suharto regime. Through the spring of 1976 (and in fact for the next four years), intelligence reports continued to suggest that while Indonesian armed forces controlled most large towns and cities, Fretilin controlled much of the countryside and was capable of mounting a 'long and expensive guerrilla resistance' . 120 During this time, Indonesian officials made repeated overtures to the Ford Administration for additional military assistance, suggesting that Fretilin resistance was both fiercer and more sustained than reported. In a meeting with US Ambassador Newsom on 28 January, Foreign Minister Adam Malik conceded that Indonesian military operations would continue for months before control over even major towns could be consolidated. 121 At the end of April, Chief of Staff of the US Pacific Command (CINCPAC) Lt. General Moore met with Indonesian Defence Ministry Assistant for Planning Major General Yoga Supardi, who warned that Indonesia was encountering a 'serious drain on resources, with shortages of ammunition for small arms, artillery, tank and naval guns' , and needed helicopters, communications equipment and 'ammunition of all calibers'. Nearly two years later General Benny Murdani told the US Embassy in Jakarta that the Indonesian military controlled less than half, and perhaps as little as 20% of the territory and its population. 122 Accounts by church sources in East Timor and defectors from the Provisional Government of East Timor, moreover, suggested that Indonesia's invasion and occupation had caused enormous death and suffering. On 14 February Francisco Lopes da Cruz, President of the Provisional Government and former leader of the UDT, declared that perhaps 60,000 East Timorese have been killed since the Indonesian invasion -nearly 10% of the population. 123 Though the State Department would later denounce such claims, at the time the US Embassy reported that such claims were credible and had been confirmed by other sources. 124 President José Martins of the tiny pro-integration KOTA Party, who had testified before the UN Security Council on 16 December 1975, also defected and submitted a letter to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim condemning Indonesia's attack. Martins stated that Indonesia's invasion had already cost 'many thousands of lives' , including thousands who had been 'machine-gunned' by invading forces, and called for an immediate withdrawal of Indonesian forces, arguing that calls for integration by the UDT and Apodeti in early December had been 'a farce, the whole thing, without the mandate of our people'. 125 Such contemporary -and credible -evidence had almost no impact on US and Commonwealth policy, which largely continued on the assumption that Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor was an irreversible fait accompli, no matter how clumsily executed. 'It is noteworthy', a British Embassy officer mused, 'that in spite of all their blundering the Indonesians seem at the moment to be getting away with everything.' 126 In early April the Indonesian Foreign Ministry announced that the PGET would hold an 'Act of Free Choice' to ratify its decision for integration with Indonesia, inviting the UN to observe. Just six years earlier, Jakarta had stage-managed a similar 'Act of Free Choice' to legitimize its takeover of West Papua, a precedent that was hard to miss. 127 UN Secretary Kurt Waldheim bluntly commented to British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Evan Luard that Indonesia wanted the UN to 'legalize their "anschluss"'. 128 'The Indonesian aim is clearly to acquire a veneer of respectability for a speedy takeover of East Timor by associating distinguished foreigners with the "act of choice"' , the South East Asian Department of the FCO reported, while the Australian and Dutch Embassies described Indonesia's invitations to foreign diplomats as 'a sham' and 'embarrassing'. 129 Indonesian officials admitted as much, conceding the need to 'stage manage to some extent' the selection of representatives who would 'petition' for integration. 130 On 31 May in Dili, 37 hand-picked members of what Indonesia described as a 'Popular Representative Assembly' unanimously voted to petition President Suharto asking for integration with Jakarta. The political consul of New Zealand's Embassy in Jakarta, the only Western diplomat in attendance, described a wholly scripted event in which the Timorese were given no choice and prevented from even speaking with foreigners. On 16 July the Indonesian Parliament passed legislation formally incorporating East Timor as Indonesia's 27th province. Richard Woolcott correctly observed 'it seems likely that the fact of integration will soon be accepted by many governments' . 131 New Zealand Secretary of Foreign Affairs Frank Corner, who noted in June that 'it is generally considered that no genuine act of self-determination can take place in East Timor so long as Indonesian troops remain' , now urged the Foreign Ministry to take the position that 'we have no evidence to show that integration with Indonesia is not the result desired by a majority of the Timorese people' . The British agreed, observing that 'since integration is now inevitable' , the FCO 'is inclined to think that as much legitimation of this integration as the circumstances permit is in our interests' . 132 A similar mood of cynicism prevailed in Washington, where in late June the Ford Administration pledged to Foreign Minister Adam Malik that it would continue pursuing closer ties to Indonesia and held out the possibility of increased military assistance. East Timor was not even discussed. Although the White House faced increased scrutiny from Congress over US support for Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor, Henry Kissinger and his staff were pleased, believing they had successfully weathered a political tempest. 133 In a 16 June staff meeting Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib happily reported of Indonesia that 'they're quite happy with the positions we have taken. We've resumed, as you know, all our normal relations with them; and there isn't any problem involved' . 'Not very willingly' , Kissinger replied -perhaps referring to the difficulties the White House had faced in deceiving Congress and continuing with military aid -'Illegally and beautifully.' 134 
Conclusion
Although the US and other countries hoped that the issue of East Timor would simply fade from view, the Indonesian invasion and annexation of the former Portuguese colony would assume an importance in regional affairs and Jakarta's bilateral relations out of all proportion to its size. East Timorese guerrilla resistance persisted for another six years, during which time an estimated 200,000 Timorese died from massacre, starvation and disease -roughly one-third of the 1975 population. During this time between 20,000 and 30,000 Indonesian troops occupied the territory, draining vast, unaccounted for resources from the Indonesian budget while Suharto's family and allies plundered Timor's resources for personal enrichment. 135 When Indonesian civil society and human rights NGOs began to more vocally criticize Suharto in the mid-1990 s, they linked the ongoing occupation of East Timor and abuses there with human rights abuses elsewhere in the archipelago, challenging Indonesian authoritarianism in the process. Although Ali Alatas, Indonesia's Foreign Minister during the last years of the New Order, characterized East Timor as merely 'a pebble in the shoe', after 20 years of a brutal and draining occupation the territory had become a festering sore, undermining the very foundations of the Suharto regime. 136 That Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor would produce the very instability that outside observers feared in 1975, exacerbating tensions within Indonesia that would eventually result in Suharto's ousting (and encourage independence movements elsewhere in the archipelago), was an irony that few considered at the time.
East Timor's aborted attempt at decolonization highlighted the vast gulf between the post-Vietnam era and the relative heyday of anti-colonial movements in the early 1960 s. While both Indonesia and its supporters justified their stances in the name of Cold War pragmatism, the territory's fate transcended Cold War concerns even as it fell victim to them. Officials in Washington and Canberra felt no pressure emanating from a rather disinterested Moscow to support Timorese independence, and saw no hint that Timor might become a site for Communist meddling, the overblown pronouncements of Indonesian generals notwithstanding. The parallels with Indonesia's takeover of West Papua in 1962 -when the Kennedy Administration backed Sukarno's irredentist campaign for fear of strengthening the power of the Indonesian Communist Party -are strikingly illustrative of this changed dynamic. 137 In both cases, however, the result was the same, with the international community actively supporting Indonesia's takeover of a smaller, weaker neighbour viewed as too primitive to survive on its own.
The response of the US, Australia, New Zealand, Britain and ASEAN nations to Indonesia's invasion of East Timor thus challenges Robert Latham's characterization of self-determination as a hallmark of liberal modernity and the 'Atlanticist order' which brought it into being. 138 Political scientist Rupert Emerson argued in early 1975 that the right to which Asian and African countries attached the most importance was 'the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . particularly if linked to the closely related outlawing of racial discrimination' in countries like Rhodesia and South Africa. 139 The international community's support for such principles in the modern era, however, has been highly contingent outside of Europe, nowhere more so than in modern Southeast Asia.
Historian Kenneth Cmiel has rightly observed that the nations of the West 'did not agree that [self-determination] was a fundamental human right' . 140 Between 1977 and 1980 the US and other supporters of Jakarta voted three times against UN General Assembly resolutions rejecting Indonesia's annexation of East Timor and reaffirming its right to self-determination, and worked to remove East Timor from the agenda of the UN decolonization committee. The US position was strikingly at odds with that of the non-aligned movement, which during this same time twice voted in favour of resolutions reaffirming East Timor's right to selfdetermination and calling for speedy independence for the territory. 141 In the eyes of Western officials, small territories such as East Timor, like West Papua before it, did seem like an anachronism compared to multi-ethnic states like Indonesia and Malaysia, where imperial powers and anti-colonial movements drew boundaries bearing scant relation to the dispersion of ethnic or linguistic groupings. The continued salience of modernization theory, moreover, provided a convenient shorthand for dismissing Timor as too backward to merit self-government. Western diplomats, while affirming East Timor's rights in principle, repeatedly rejected them in practice, effectively ruling out independence and framing self-determination squarely in the context of integration with Indonesia. Even as they monitored Indonesia's covert military attack on Timor and acknowledged the Suharto regime's intention to take the territory by force, Indonesia's neighbours and supporters praised the regime's 'restraint' and expressed 'understanding' for its position, sending unambiguous signals that East Timor's territorial integrity ranked a distant second to the overriding priority of maintaining cordial relations with Jakarta.
Such sentiments would more than once come back to haunt the international community. During the April 1976 UN Security Council debates over East Timor, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office noted the need to 'affirm the right of the East Timorese to self-determination. Otherwise we would be on weak ground in supporting the equivalent rights of the Falkland Islanders and Belize'. The tepid UN reaction to Argentina's invasion of the Falklands in 1982 proved the wisdom of such concerns. Less than a decade later, President Saddam Hussein expressed his surprise at the international community's reaction to his aggression against Kuwait, commenting that the world had 'turned a blind eye' to Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. 142 The tragedy of East Timor is how easily Indonesia's invasion could have been prevented by the international community, in particular by the United States. Even as Indonesian oil revenues climbed, Jakarta's creditors, foreign investors and international institutions retained significant leverage through their provision of economic and military assistance, the withdrawal of which would have crippled the Suharto regime. As the Vietnam War wound to a close, the Ford Administration possessed an unusual degree of influence over Suharto, who remained committed to military modernization using US equipment, anxious to forge closer ties to Washington, and concerned about international opinion. There is no evidence, however, that the Ford Administration even considered exerting any pressure on Indonesia not to invade. Jussi Hanhimäki, among others, has suggested that it is questionable whether the US could have persuaded Suharto not to attack East Timor. 143 Such arguments, however, ignore ample evidence at the time that Suharto only reluctantly acceded to the pressure of his hawkish advisors on Timor and only after receiving clear signals of support from Washington. Moreover, the proper time frame for assessing the international community's leverage over Jakarta is not the days leading up to the invasion but the 12 months prior, when Indonesia began signalling its intentions and persistently sounding out the views of its allies and supporters.
And although the US Embassy in Jakarta adopted a 'damned if we do, damned if we don't' attitude to justify its public silence on Timor, there is little evidence to suggest that firm opposition to an invasion would have produced any rupture in US-Indonesia relations, as the NSC warned at the time. Interviewed by a journalist in the mid-1990 s, former CIA Director William Colby speculated that opposition by the Ford Administration to an invasion -in the form of a threatened cutoff of military assistance -would have resulted in 'a few weeks of diplomatic tension' before relations 'returned to normal'. 144 However, President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's fixation with US credibility after the fall of Saigon and the White House's desire to bolster Indonesia's role as a potential counterweight to Vietnamese and Chinese power in the region makes it difficult to imagine circumstances in which they would have risked alienating Suharto on a matter of principle. As Kissinger told a State Department staff meeting just days after Indonesia's invasion, 'no one who has worked with me in the last two years could not know what my view would be on Timor'. 145 Washington's allies in Canberra, London and Wellington largely shared the Secretary's assessment. 'If the crisis has any lesson for posterity', a lengthy report by Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office argued in March 1976, 'that is the difficulty of developing some acceptable and practicable concept of international law and morals. Morals and the law do not always go hand in hand. Self-determination is a laudable principle, but it may not always be morally right to grant it. ' 146 East Timor would spend the next 23 years struggling to realize this principle and prove the international community wrong.
